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Abstract
Previous studies imply that a positive regional scal shock, such as a resource boom, strength-
ens the desire for separation. In this paper we present a new and opposite perspective. We con-
struct a model of endogenous scal decentralization that builds on two key notions: a trade-o¤
between risk sharing and heterogeneity, and a positive association between resource booms and
risk. The model shows that a resource windfall causes the nation to centralize as a mechanism
to either share risk and/or prevent local capture, depending on the relative bargaining power
of the central and regional governments. We provide cross country empirical evidence for the
main hypotheses, 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1 Introduction
The reasons behind why nations centralize or why regions demand higher levels of independence
are of rst order importance. One contributing factor might be the discovery of natural resources.
A windfall of natural riches often provides an enormous source of income that leads to conict
over its distribution, and can even threaten the nations unity. This paper tries to unfold this
resources-unity nexus by addressing the following question: do resource booms a¤ect the level of
scal decentralization (henceforth, FD)? Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that resource
booms may in fact contribute to the unication of nations, by leading to higher levels of government
centralization.
Previous studies on the determinants of FD such as Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Oates (1972),
Panizza (1999) and Treisman (2006)) identify several key determinants, ranging from historical and
geographical to cultural and institutional. However, very little attention has been devoted to the
role that natural resources may have in this.1 This paper contributes to this strand of the literature
by lling this gap and presenting new insights on the association between natural resources and
decentralization.
The potential association between natural resources and FD has been observed in several oc-
casions. Its Scotlands Oilwas the widely publicized slogan used in the 1970s by the Scottish
National Party to promote Scottish independence; as the slogan implies, the discovery of oil in the
North Sea (within the territory of Scotland) created a struggle, between Scotland and the United
Kingdom, on the scal control over the oil rents. A more extreme case is Sudan, which eventually
split into two nations mainly due to the large oil reserves located in the south. Boadway (2006)
discusses the inuential role of resource booms in Canadian scal federalism; indeed, various agree-
ments made between the provincial and federal governments of Canada regarding regional scal
control over natural wealth provide an indication for that. Similarly, drawing on the related litera-
ture on natural resources and conicts, various studies indirectly document the e¤ects of resource
booms on levels of scal control in developing nations such as Angola, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria,
and Sierra Leone, among others (see Ross (2004), (2006), and Blattman and Miguel (2010), for
surveys).
Albeit not explicitly formalized, a similar correlation is suggested by previous models of endoge-
nous FD. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) and Panizza (1999), for instance, imply that a regional
scal shock is expected to increase the level of FD, and strengthen the desire for separation. Ob-
1An exception is Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009), who nd that resource rich Russian regions tend to have
more centralized governments. Unlike these authors, we provide national-level, cross country empirical evidence that
addresses potential endogeneity issues and is linked to a formal theory that emphasizes di¤erent mechanisms.
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served patterns may, however, hide other factors whose inuence on decentralization demands is
simply exacerbated by natural resources. For example, ethnic fractionalization is often the trigger
for many secessionist conicts. To illustrate this point notice that in the Scottish case we have the
historical tension between the Scots and the Anglo-Saxons; and in Sudan, the Arabs in the north
versus the Africans in the south.
We o¤er a theory and empirical evidence that point at the opposite direction; namely, that
resource booms can lower the level of FD. The theory treats FD as an endogenous variable, and
investigates how it might be a¤ected by a windfall of natural resources, building on two main fea-
tures: (i) a trade-o¤ between risk sharing and heterogeneity, and (ii) a positive association between
resources and risk. The heterogeneity assumption follows Panizza (1999), and is a consequence of
spatial decay of public goodse¢ ciency. In turn, the positive association between resource wealth
and volatility has been widely discussed in previous studies (e.g. Poelhekke and Van der Ploeg
(2009)). Furthermore, as Figure 1 illustrates, this relationship is also a feature of our sample,
showing a positive correlation between the share of oil rents in GDP and the standard deviation in
the growth of real GDP per capita ( = 0:74).2
Focusing on cases where regional demands matter, risk sharing is the main mechanism put
forward by our theory.3 In the model, we consider two sources of risk: revenue volatility, and
local ine¢ ciency. The rst is based on several studies documenting excessive volatility in oil prices
(Blattman et al. (2007), and Davis et al. (2001)), and the incentive this provides for governments to
share the risk involved (Stroebel and Benthem (2013)). The second is motivated by the notion that
resource dependence may create adverse e¤ects such as corruption and other development-inhibiting
risks that fall under the so-called natural resource curse hypothesis.4 Importantly, these e¤ects can
also provide resource rich regional governments an incentive to mitigate them through sharing.
Indeed, recent studies indicate that resource-booming local governments are able to mitigate the
adverse e¤ects of resources, and even grow on the account of their neighboring resource poor regions,
in scally decentralized and federalized economies (Beine et al. (2014), Cai and Treisman (2005),
Papyrakis and Raveh (2014), and Raveh (2013)).
In the model, the central and regional governments (henceforth, CG and RG, respectively)
have di¤erent incentives regarding FD. In particular, if the former does not care about the latters
2 In the empirical part we describe these variables and discuss the sample in detail.
3Previous secession models such as Bolton and Roland (1997), and Buchanan and Faith (1987) focus as well on
regional demands. We substantiate this point further in the empirical part.
4The natural resource curse hypothesis describes an inverse relationship between natural resource abundance and
long-term economic growth; see Van der Ploeg (2011) for a review of the literature. Within this literature, Perez-
Sebastian and Raveh (2015) show that FD can help explain the resource curse nding, but do not study the e¤ect of
natural resources on FD.
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welfare, it would prefer full centralization regardless of the amount of natural riches being the
standard result in the literature. The FD trade-o¤ is at work only if RG has some bargaining
power and, as a consequence, CG decides to account for RGs preferences when determining the
equilibrium level of FD. Under these circumstances, in which regional demands are taken seriously,
the model shows that a resource boom can lead to more centralization due to either the incentive
that CG has to reduce the impact of regional o¢ cialsrent-extraction behavior and/or the RGs
desire to share the risks involved across the nation. The risk sharing mechanism becomes relatively
more important as RGs bargaining power rises.
In the empirical exercise, we motivate our focus on FD (as opposed to political decentralization),
and test the models main predictions, including the hypothesized association between resource
booms and FD. For that, we employ a large panel of countries, spanning over several decades, and
use the Kearney Decentralization Index (Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)), and the World Banks
Vertical Imbalance measure, to approach the endogenous variable. Since the Kearney index is
discrete in nature, probit estimation techniques are used, along with linear methods. As a measure
of resource abundance, we employ several proxies. The rst is GDP share of oil rents, which is
suggested by the model. The other measures are chosen so as to address possible endogeneity issues;
these include stock measures of giant oil elds, and price-based measures that exploit exogenous
variations in the price of crude oil. The main analyses, as well as several robustness checks that
test di¤erent controls and time periods, indicate that resource booms negatively a¤ect FD (with
no apparent U-shaped e¤ects), and have no impact on political decentralization.
In addition, we also test the risk sharing mechanism proposed by the model, and compare it
against other potential channels. For this, we use a standard volatility proxy: the standard deviation
in the growth of real GDP per capita. While each of the additional potential channels that we test
do not a¤ect the impact of resources, the risk proxy does. When added to the regressions, the e¤ect
of resources on FD vanishes, that is, their impact net of riskbecomes statistically insignicant
and with substantially lower magnitude; moreover, consistent with the predictions of the model, we
nd this result is primarily driven by cases where RGs have some relatively signicant bargaining
power, as opposed to when CG is relatively stronger where resource booms decrease FD irrespective
of risk. Importantly, we observe the former cases apply to a major portion of our sample. Last,
based on the assumption that local ine¢ ciency worsens with weaker institutions, we test for the
relative dominance of the revenue volatility and local ine¢ ciency e¤ects by adding an interaction
term of our proxies for institutional quality and resources. As the relevant coe¢ cient is not precisely
estimated, we conclude that although both e¤ects may incentivize risk sharing, it is the revenue
volatility e¤ect that appears to be the larger contributor.
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Besides the literature on the determinants of decentralization, our work is also related to papers
on the importance of volatility in resource extraction and management, which include Poelhekke
and Van der Ploeg (2009, 2010), Van den Bremer and Van der Ploeg (2013), Van der Ploeg (2010)
and Stroebel and Benthem (2013). None of them focus on government decentralization. Several
authors such as Persson and Tabellini (1996a, 1996b) analyze scal transfers among regions as a way
to share risk; unlike them, we allow for di¤erent levels of decentralization including the possibility
of secession, and look into the consequences of resource booms. The paper is as well related to the
literature on secession and the endogenous size of nations, including Alesina and Spolaore (1997),
Bolton and Roland (1997), and Buchanan and Faith (1987). As Alesina and Spolaore (2005) argue
in their survey, the basic trade-o¤ in this literature is between preference heterogeneity and e¢ ciency
in the provision of public goods. Our main trade-o¤, instead, is between preference heterogeneity
and risk sharing, with applicability to the case of natural resource discoveries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical analysis. Section 3 carries
out the empirical work. Section 4 summarizes our main ndings and o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Natural Resources and Fiscal Decentralization
We build a model similar to Arzaghi and Hendersons (2005). Our framework, however, proposes an
alternative trade-o¤ tightly linked to natural resources, and can account for partial decentralization.
The exploitation of natural riches is subject to revenue volatility that harms the economy due to
risk aversion. In addition, central and regional governments may face di¤erent costs associated with
the exploitation of natural resources. Both revenue volatility and local ine¢ ciency increase with
the stock of natural capital. Under these circumstances, the endogenous level of decentralization
can diminish after a resource windfall. At the end of the section we discuss the robustness of the
results to alternative assumptions.
2.1 The environment
The economy is composed of two regions: region 1 hosts the central government (CG); region 2 has
natural resources and a regional authority (RG). FD means that RG is allowed to keep a fraction
of the taxes and natural resource rents collected in the area to partially nance public goods. If
region 2 obtains a relatively larger fraction then the economy is more scally decentralized. As in
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), we assume for simplicity that the constitution forces to charge the
same income tax rate () and enjoy the same level of public goods per capita (g) in all regions
within the union.
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Region j is populated by Lj inhabitants, with L1 > L2.5 Each risk averse individual in a region
receives an amount of non-natural-resource income equal to yj . Peoples preferences are given by:
u =
 
xg1 

; (1)
where x is the per capita level of private good consumption. The parameters ;  2 (0; 1), where 
captures the degree of risk aversion.
A fraction of taxes and resource rents are collected by CG and the rest by RG. The amount
collected by RG serves to nance, at the local level, a fraction  of the public good, and the rest
is supplied by the central authority. Following Panizza (1999), there is spatial decay associated
to CGs provision of the public good to RG. This can be regarded as having a preference for
heterogeneity (i.e. putting larger weight on the local public goods), or simply as a cost for delivering
public goods to a distant region; in either case, this guarantees that RG will demand some degree
of decentralization, even in the absence of natural resources. Thus, the amount of public goods
measured in e¢ ciency units in region 2 equals [(1  )(1  ) + ]g, or [1  (1  )]g; where  is
the spatial decay parameter, and ;  2 [0; 1]. Clearly, in region 1, CG will supply all the public
goods and collect all taxes.
The above information implies that we can write (1) as:
u1 =

y1 (1  )g1 

; (2)
and
u2 =
h
y2 (1  ) [1  (1  )]1  g1 
i
; (3)
for regions 1 and 2, respectively.
Revenues net of direct and indirect costs from the exploitation of natural resources equal Z(1 
b). The variable Z is random, subject to relatively large uctuations due to changes in the price
of minerals (as documented by Davis et al. (2001), for instance). Consistent with the evidence on
the said natural resource curse, a fraction b of potential revenue is lost due to moral hazard and
corruption problems; because this amount is captured by local o¢ cials, we refer to Zb as local
capture. Notice that the chosen formalization, via the negative impact of  on revenues, underlines
two assumptions: rst, it supposes these adverse e¤ects a¤ect RG more strongly than CG; second,
it suggests that FD raises corruption in natural resource abundant regions.
Let us elaborate on these last two suppositions. Starting with the rst, while it may be a
5Although we consider two regions for simplicity, one can think of a setup with N regions, where CG is an
amalgamation of the N-1 resource poor ones. With this framework in mind, we nd this relative-size assumption
applicable.
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consequence of RGs smaller size,6 it may also be triggered by additional sources. For instance,
Wilson (1966) argues that state-level politics are more prone to corruption because state capitals are
far away from the main metropolitan areas and, as a consequence, face less scrutiny by citizens and
the media. Along the same lines, Prudhomme (1995) believes that there are more opportunities
for corruption at the local level, because local o¢ cials usually have more discretionary powers than
national decision makers, and because local authorities are likely to be more subject to pressing
demands from local interest groups. More recently, Bardhan (2002), Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000), and Brosio (2006) also argue that the lower the level of government the less the capacity to
control costs and the higher the degree of corruption, especially in developing nations.
Importantly, the assumption also obtains empirical support in the data. Using wide samples of
nations, Goldsmith (1999) and Treisman (2000) nd that states with more tiers of government have,
on average, higher perceived corruption. Campante and Do (2014) show that isolation is related to
more corruption. In particular, using data in U.S. states, they nd that isolated capital cities are
robustly associated with greater corruption levels because isolation weakens accountability mech-
anisms such as newspapers coverage. Their result is important for our purposes because natural
resources are located, on average, in low density and isolated areas (e.g., see Perez-Sebastian and
Raveh (2015)). Other papers, like Glaeser and Saks (2006), obtain evidence that states are more
prone to corruption than the central government. More specically, employing federal corruption
convictions, they nd that corruption in U.S. states increases with the fraction of government em-
ployment that is related to local government employees, but falls with the share of state government
workers.
Moving to the second supposition, evidence suggest that decentralization increases corruption
when linked to scal windfalls that are taken as given by local authorities a particular case being
revenues from natural resourcesbecause it can facilitate capture of local governments, and collu-
sion between o¢ cers and elites at the local level.7 For example, Caselli and Michaels (2013) nd
that in Brazil, a scally decentralized nation, municipalities that enjoy an oil-based scal windfall
become more corrupted. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) test the hypothesis put forward by Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2000) that the case for decentralization of poverty reduction programs critically
depends on the extent of local program capture by the elites. They nd evidence of substantial local
elite capture within the Food for Education program in Bangladesh. Similar evidence is found by
Araujo et al. (2008) for a social development fund in Ecuador. Jia and Nie (2015) show that decen-
6Being the smaller economy, a resource windfall will take a larger share in RGs GSP than in CGs, hence making
RG relatively more susceptible to the adverse e¤ects of resources, compared to CG, given an equivalent windfall.
7This does not imply that, in general, FD increases corruption. The empirical evidence on this is not conclusive.
See, for example, Lambsdor¤ (2005), and Mookherjee (2015) for reviews of the literature, and Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) and Seabright (1996) for views stressing that FD should rather diminish the extent of corruption.
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tralization in China has facilitated collusion between coal mines and industry regulators. Duek and
Rusli (2010) provide evidence that decentralization policies that have granted more authority to
Indonesian states to generate higher own revenues from natural resources have led to wider spread
of corruption. Last, results in Brollo et al. (2012) and Fisman and Gatti (2002) strongly support
that FD in the form of scal windfalls has raised corruption levels in Brazilian municipalities and
U.S. states, respectively.
An additional key assumption, consistent as well with evidence mentioned previously, is that
resource windfalls increase risk. Specically, both the revenue volatility and the local ine¢ ciency
e¤ects increase with Z. The former occurs because we suppose that the variance of Z denoted
by 2zrises with the stock of natural resources (later we discuss an example in detail), and the
latter because the cost of the ine¢ ciency equals Zb. In addition, we abstract from making any
specic assumptions on the distribution of resource rents apart from considering extreme scenarios
in which either CG or RG fully control Z. The reason is that, within the union, the government
that controls the resource rents can impact the equilibrium outcome only through its e¤ect on
bargaining power.
Finally, the interpretation of Z deserves some comment. Although referred to as a measure
of rents, Z can be regarded more generally as a measure of the resource sector, or a measure of
resource dependence. Nevertheless, all these alternative interpretations deliver a Z that remains
susceptible to the risk involved with a resource windfall. The option to consider a more general
view that may include such interpretations will prove useful in our discussion on volatility and its
potential e¤ects.
Given the above information, we can write the budget constraint for the union as:
L1y1 + L2y2 + Z(1  b) = (L1 + L2) g; (4)
and for region 2, if it becomes an independent nation, as:8
L2y2 + Z(1  b) = L2g: (5)
We consider a two-stage political scenario. In the rst stage, before the price of minerals is
known, CG and RG are elected democratically by the inhabitants of the whole country and the
ones of region 2, respectively.9 At that time, a decision of whether or not to pursue a secession
8The one-period budget constraints (4) and (5) must always hold. This is clearly a simplication of the model.
Considering an intertemporal budget constraint could have been more appropriate for addressing a wider set of issues;
however, since allowing governments to borrow should not have any qualitative impact on our main results, we follow
the simplifying setting.
9This framework follows Hateld and Miquel (2012), and is used primarily for convenience. Main results would
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attempt must also be made by RG. In the second stage, the state of nature (i.e., the price, and
consequently the value of Z) is revealed; governments then decide scal policy by choosing the levels
of , g, and  . If CG and RG belong to the same union, scal policy is decided by the stronger
CG who assigns an exogenous weight to RGs preferences based on equalization schemes driven
by the regions relative population size. The bargaining power of RG in this context comes from
the constraint imposed on CGs decision by the probability that the secession attempt succeeds.
These simplifying assumptions, motivated by some of the anecdotes discussed initially, will allow
to obtain clean results that will later guide the empirical exercise on the main mechanisms that
drive the e¤ect of natural resources on FD.
2.2 Preliminary analysis
For the ease of exposition, we rst derive some useful results, and thereafter turn to the analysis
of the two-stage game. Specically, we look into the separate cases of Independence and Union to
illustrate the potential costs of benets of resource rents within our framework, and their e¤ect on
the FD trade-o¤.
2.2.1 Independence
We start by examining the case where the two regions are independent states. Denote uIj the utility
obtained in this scenario by region j, where I stands for independence. Natural resources would
be fully controlled by region 2 where they are located. Both countries would face very similar
problems, determining the level of government spending only. For concreteness, let us focus on
region 2. Substituting equality (5) into objective function (3) for  = 1 and  = 0, we get that the
value of g is chosen such that:
max
g
(
uI2 =

y2

1  L2g   Z(1  b)
L2y2

g1 
)
: (6)
The level of public goods that solves this maximization problem is:
g = (1  )

L2y2 + Z(1  b)
L2

: (7)
That is, the level of public good provision is a fraction given by the weight of g in the utility
functionof total income net of the amount of local capture Zb. The parameter b appears in the
not change if other regimes are considered, as long as CG represents the interest of the resource poor regions. Albeit
being interesting, we consider the case where CG is controlled by the resource rich region as a rare scenario beyond
the scope of this work. In addition, we abstract from making any further specic assumptions on the quality of
institutions. As will be evident in the empirical part, institutional quality does not seem to play a key role in this.
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last two expressions because of the larger tax rate needed to nance a given level of the public good
due to corruption. Arguably, RG might not care about it since gains of those that benet from
corruption may o¤set the losses; we argue in section 2.5 that explicitly considering this rent-seeking
behavior should not a¤ect our results.
RGs level of welfare under independence is obtained by substituting solution (7) into problem
(6)s objective function; which delivers:
uI2 =

 (1  )1 

L2y2 + Z(1  b)
L2

: (8)
The value of uI2 then depends on per capita net income from resource and non-resource sources,
the weights of the two consumption goods in the utility function, and the rate of risk aversion.
2.2.2 Union
Next, we derive some of the basic results if the two states are within a union. First, use budget
constraint (4) to solve for the tax rate necessary to nance a given level of g. We obtain
 =
Lg   Z(1  b)
Y
; (9)
where Y = L1y1 + L2y2, and L = L1 + L2. Expression (9) takes into account that both  and g
need to be the same in the two regions.
The unions problem is determining scal policy. CG, which represents region 1s median
voter given that L1 > L2, is the one that makes the decision. It is straightforward that, due
to their di¤erent preferences, the two governments have di¤erent optimal decentralization levels;
each government seeks to get as close as possible to its median voters preferred scal policy. We
assume that CG takes into account RGs preferences when making the decision, based on its relative
population size. Hence, dening  = L1=L, we can think of the optimal solution as the outcome of
the following maximization problem:
max
;g

uD1 + (1  )uD2
	
; (10)
In problem (10), functions uD1 and u
D
2 denote utility for region 1 and 2, respectively, when they
belong to the union. More specically, substituting (9) into preferences (2) and (3) yield:
uD1 =

y1

1  Lg   Z(1  b)
Y

g1 

(11)
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uD2 =

y2

1  Lg   Z(1  b)
Y

[1  (1  )]1  g1 

: (12)
Notice that even if RG does not internalize the consequences of its o¢ cialscorruption (the cost
Zb), the government that decides, CG, wants to take them into account because those losses hurt
region 1.
The FOC to problem (10) with respect to g provides the optimal amount of public goods as:
g = (1  )

Y + Z(1  b)
L

: (13)
As above, investment in public goods equals a constant fraction of total per capita rents. The
largest possible level of g is achieved when  equals zero.
Using (13) we can derive RGs indirect utility within the union as a function of . This is
obtained by combining optimality condition (13) and expression (12):
uD2 () =
(
y2
Y + Z(1  b)
Y
 
(1   + ) (1  ) Y + Z(1  b)
L
1 )
;
or rewriting it,
uD2 () =


y2
Y=L

[(1  ) (1   + )]1 

Y + Z(1  b)
L

: (14)
Function (14) displays an inverted U-shape provided that the ratio of output to resource rents
is su¢ ciently large, and in particular, Y=Z > (1   )b=[(1   )]   1. Under this assumption,
the decrease in the spatial decay ine¢ ciency due to additional units of g being supplied by RG
dominates for low levels of FD, whereas the higher costs related to a larger  dominates when FD
is su¢ ciently high. Below, we use this expression to obtain the optimal level of decentralization.
2.3 Stage 1: RGs perspective
Armed with the above, we now start advancing towards deriving the equilibrium level of FD in the
two-stage game. As mentioned, this begins with RGs decision on whether to become independent.
Independence represents a more important decision than scal policy: it is relatively permanent,
and may even need a modication of the constitution. For this reason, we assume that this decision
is made before the state of nature is known, at the time when RG is elected. In addition, there is an
exogenously-determined probability, denoted by ", that the secession attempt succeeds, depending
on the relative strength of the two governments; thus, " represents RGs relative power.10 For this
10The exogenous nature of this parameter is assumed for simplicity. We think of its value as being inuenced by
deep determinants of the probability that the region can become independent. They would include the military power
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probability to inuence the rst-stage outcome CG needs to impose a penalty on RG if the attempt
ends up being a failure; for simplicity, we assume that if that is the case the payo¤ that RG receives
equals zero.
Stage one provides RGs minimum acceptable level of , denote it ^. Given the threat of
independence, CG would later need to o¤er a level of  equal or larger than the one that makes
RG indi¤erent between staying and leaving the union. This indi¤erence condition must hold in
expected terms; that is,
E["uI2] = E[u
D
2 (^)]:
From expressions (8) and (14), this implies that:
" E
"
L2y2 + Z(1  b)
L2
#
=

[1  (1  ^)]1 

y2
Y=L

E
"
Y + Z(1  b^)
L
#
: (15)
Suppose that there is a resource discovery. The question is how ^ will change in expression
(15), assuming that ^ takes on a value to the left of the one that maximizes the RHS (otherwise, ^
would not change). E¤ects can go in both directions. On the one hand, independence implies that
the new resources are split among less people (4Z=L2 > 4Z=L), causing a reduction in the tax
rate and an increase in the provision of public goods call it the mean e¤ect. On the other hand,
the discovery increases uncertainty, and risk averse agents value that the union represents a larger
economy, more able to diversify risks and diminish the incidence of revenue volatility on the tax rate
and public goods. The impact of local ine¢ ciency shows up as well in condition (15): net revenues
from natural resources will be smaller and, as a consequence, the tax burden necessary to nance
a given level of public goods will be larger if region 2 becomes independent (1  b < 1  b^). The
mean e¤ect then pushes towards independence, whereas the local ine¢ ciency and revenue volatility
e¤ects call for a decline in the level of ^ as Z rises. Hence, depending on parameter values, RGs
risk-sharing and corruption-minimizing incentives can dominate RGs incentives to consume its own
resource wealth.
To see the importance of volatility, and how it can lead to a reduction in ^, let us assume
that resource rents Z equals pN ; where the variables N and p represent the constant ow and
the random price of natural resources, respectively. The variable p is distributed with mean p
and variance 2. Clearly, the variance of Z equals N22, which increases with N . Let us also
approximate the terms inside the expectation operator in both sides of expression (15) employing
a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean.
of both sides, as well as cultural and ethnic di¤erences, among others. The level of FD is, on the contrary, considered
endogenous in the model; the main reason is that it represents the central theme in the analysis.
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The new denition of Z implies that the expectation located in the RHS of (15) can be approx-
imated as:
E
"
Y + Z(1  b^)
L
#


Y + pN(1  b^)
L
 2641  (1  )2
1
1 b^
Y
N + p
2
375 : (16)
In the RHS of this last expression, the terms in the rst and second squared brackets provide the
positive mean e¤ect and the negative volatility e¤ect of an increase in the stock of N , respectively.
We see that the negative volatility e¤ect rises with N=Y , that is, with the resource-output ratio.
From this result, it is easy to deduce that, in the case of RG, the relevant ratio that determines the
impact of increasing volatility will be N=L2y2 (see next expression). Therefore, the fall in expected
utility caused by the increase in volatility will be larger for an independent RG than under the
union. This is the driving force behind the result presented in the next paragraph.
Performing the approximation of the term inside the other expectation operator and using (16),
we can turn (15) into:
"

Y + (1  b^)pN
L2y2 + (1  b)pN
2 
=
n
[1  (1  ^)]1 

y2
Y=L
o

L
L2
 
1 b
1 b^
2
h
Y
(1 b^)N + p
i2   (1  )2h
L2y2
(1 b)N + p
i2   (1  )2 : (17)
The LHS of (17) always declines with N . The RHS, on the other hand, can go up or down depending
on whether the variance 2 is su¢ ciently large compared to the mean p. For example, if p equals
zero then it is easy to show that the RHS will go up withN , provided that Y=(1 b^) > L2y2=(1 b).
As a consequence, for a su¢ ciently small p and a su¢ ciently high ratio Y=y2, the negative volatility
e¤ect will dominate and CG will be able to impose a smaller level of FD after a natural resource
windfall.
What about the e¤ect of a change in the probability of a successful secession attempt? If " falls,
it is easy to deduce from (15) that the value of ^ that equalizes both sides of the expression will be
smaller (again, assuming that ^ is to the left of the RHS maximum). Given that the probability
that a secession attempt succeeds depends on the relative strength of the two players, we can
conclude that a stronger RG will demand a larger minimum decentralization level.
The above exercise, hence, illustrates how RG may have an incentive to centralize following a
resource boom, based on risk sharing motives. It also points out the importance of RGs relative
bargaining power: the stronger CG is, the lower would be RGs minimum acceptable FD level;
notice that as " approaches zero, so does ^. Having established ^, we next turn to discuss the next
phase.
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2.4 Stage 2: Equilibrium level of FD
Stage 1 determined the minimum value of  that RG is willing to accept. At the beginning of stage
2, the value of Z (or p if we follow the example given above) is revealed. CG takes this into account
to determine the equilibrium level of FD. As explained, this process may factor in various issues
that range from a simple agreement to past unsuccessful secession attempts or local riots, which
we assume eventually conclude in some form of cooperation that maintains the union.11
Thus, CG solves problem (10) subject to   ^. Substituting (13) into the FOC with respect
to  gives the optimal level of FD when  > ^ as a solution to the following implicit function:
 [1  (1  )]1 (1 )
(1  )(2  )

y1
y2

+  =
1
2  

1  
b

Y
Z
+ 1

  1  


: (18)
It can be easily proven that the optimal  in the interior solution decreases with the ratio of natural
rents to output (Z=Y ), a measure that we will exploit in the empirical part.
To elaborate on CGs perspective, we note that it seeks full centralization, as per the standard
result in the literature. This is observed through , CGs relative population size; for a su¢ ciently
large value of it,  becomes zero.12 The incentive with respect to natural resources relates to the
amount of local capture (Zb), which CG internalizes given that the amount of taxes necessary to
cover a given g increases with it. In e¤ect, it brings a cost to CG, incentivizing it to centralize. In
the following section we discuss further potential interpretations of this.
An important issue is whether the equilibrium  is going to be binding. If it is, then  will
equal ^, and as we have learned in stage 1, RGs perspective will dominate that is, risk sharing
will be the main force behind the negative reaction of  as a consequence of a natural resource
boom. If on the other hand, the solution is interior, CGs perspective will be the one behind this
negative impact, and risk sharing will play no role.
The key to the last issue is the relative strength of RG. Put di¤erently, the latter insight reduces
in our model to the probability that RG can succeed in a secession attempt. If " is su¢ ciently small,
^ will also be su¢ ciently low and the constraint on the value of  will not be binding; conversely,
if " is su¢ ciently large, the constraint will be binding. Therefore, the conclusion is that, only
when RG is su¢ ciently strong, risk sharing becomes an important determinant of the degree of
FD; otherwise, CGs desire to lower FD is the main driving force, under which risk sharing does
11This, in turn, means that while independence is a possibility in the model, we focus on examining the union-based
outcomes. A corollary is that, as will be evident, in equilibrium a secession never occurs.
12A corollary to the above is that local ine¢ ciency in the model guarantees that an equilibrium with  2 (0; 1) exists.
Without this ine¢ ciency, neither CG nor RG would experience any cost from FD. Hence, CG would be indi¤erent
about the value of , and RG would always prefer either  = 1 or independence. Under these circumstances, revenue
volatility would only contribute to the decision of choosing between  = 1 and independence.
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not play a role. These empirical predictions will be taken to the data in the next section.
2.5 Discussion
Let us recap the main insights of the model. Provided RG has at least some bargaining power
and that the negative local ine¢ ciency and volatility e¤ects are su¢ ciently dominant, we learn
that the level of FD is a monotonically decreasing function of resource dependence, and that the
importance of risk sharing in the determination of the level of FD increases with RGs relative
bargaining power. In the empirical part we take these predictions to the data.
First, however, we dig deeper into the robustness of these theoretical results. In particular, we
next elaborate on some of the models main assumptions, its sensitivity to a change in them, and
to the addition of new ones considered by previous literature. Specically, concerning the latter
point, we consider the option of adding rent-seeking politicians to the model, and we discuss the
relation of a key assumption derived from the related literature on the endogenous size of nations
to our framework.
In our framework, two fundamental assumptions trigger the above results: the rst is that
CG represents the larger economy, and the second is that corruption hits RG more strongly when
interacted with resource booms. We note that neither is crucial to the analysis independently; it is
su¢ cient that just one of them holds to derive the key results. This is true for both RGs and CGs
perspectives. Starting with the former, RG prefers some centralization following a resource boom
to share the risk of revenue volatility and local ine¢ ciency; the rst occurs through the cross-region
size di¤erences, and the second through the cross-region corruption-sensitivity di¤erences. Having
one of them is su¢ cient for incentivising RG to centralize. We, however, emphasized the volatility
e¤ect because it is not clear whether in reality RG would try to control its own corruption, and
also because we show below that rent-seeking policymakers in RG could also prefer less FD when
facing increasing volatility.
As for CG, while within our framework its incentives to centralize depend primarily on the cross-
region corruption-sensitivity di¤erences and the costs it bears on FD, some simple modications can
lead to similar results under di¤erent triggering factors, making the one we preferred emphasizing
in the model not crucial for CG. For instance, it may well be that CG simply seeks to maximize
its income following a resource boom and hence advances centralization, or that otherwise it seeks
to centralize regardless of natural resources, as per the standard result in previous FD models.
Another way to observe this is if we consider a more political-based point of view, as we do below.
Let us next modify our basic setup introducing rent-seeking politicians, a view that may be
more applicable for developing nations which take an integral part in our analysis. Thus, dene
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R as the rents that politicians in region 2 extract, and equalize the parameter b to zero; notice
that the new scenario amounts to endogenizing the amount of local capture. The budget constraint
implies that the tax rate needed to nance a given amount of public goods will then be given by:
 = 1  R+ Lg   Z
Y
: (19)
Rents harm the union because they increase the tax rate. As long as rents are treated as a normal
good in the utility function, R will grow with local governments revenues, that is, with the level of
FD times Z. As a consequence, even if CG also behaves as a rent seeker, it will still want to restrict
RG-politicians extraction capacity to increase its own income, by diminishing . In addition,
government o¢ cialsrents will also be a¤ected by revenue volatility from natural resources, and
as before, volatility will increase if there is a natural resource windfall, thus decreasing  so long
as rent seekers are su¢ ciently risk averse. The conclusion from this exercise is that a rent seeking
behavior on the part of RG and/or CG should not have any signicant e¤ect on the results obtained
in the theoretical analysis.
In the model we suppose that the weight 1  that CG assigns to RGs preferences is population
based, and hence does not depend on the current value of the secession-success probability " our
proxy for the RGs degree of power. Alternatively, we could consider a di¤erent interpertation of 
so that CGs relative strength a¤ects both  and ", and that their values are negatively correlated.
With this modication, where  is no longer capped, the comparative static analysis related to a
change in the bargaining power of the governments would become more tedious. In particular, in
order for the equilibrium  to be (not to be) binding when the RG (CG) is su¢ ciently strong, we
would need that the e¤ect of changes in the strength is su¢ ciently larger on " than on . This
might not be unreasonable, because the weight  may depend as well on equalization schemes across
regions, and therefore should tend to be more stable than the probability of becoming independent
from the union.
An assumption that we do not consider but that is frequently employed in the literature on
the optimal number of nations is Alesina and Spolaore´s (1997): countries are formed by di¤erent
regions to share the xed costs associated to the provision of public goods. Alesina and Spolaore
suppose that if a region wants to provide its own public goods then it needs to cover the whole
xed cost (call it F ), so that it is multiplied by the number of providers. The implication is
that the distance between regions needs to be su¢ ciently large to have more than one nation.
Incorporating this assumption into our setup should not have a qualitative impact on our results.
More specically, having F > 0 would require a su¢ ciently large degree of spatial decay in order to
derive a positive optimal level of ; however, once the solution is interior, qualitative results would
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not vary because local ine¢ ciency would still remain e¤ective at determining .
This conclusion could change, for example, if we instead incorporate into our model the following
modied version of the xed cost: we can consider that there is a xed cost F that CG needs to
pay in order to provide g (or a fraction of it) to the whole union; and that RG also needs to pay a
xed cost equal to d times , with d > 0 and d  F . In this scenario, even if we supposed that
b equals zero, some degree of FD would still be desirable due to the spatial decay of the services
provided by public goods.
It can be shown that under the new premises:
 = 1  F + d  Z(1  b) + Lg
Y
; (20)
and that the optimal level of decentralization when  equals zero is given by:
 =
1
2  

(1  )Y + Z   F
d+ Zb
  1  


: (21)
That is, a larger stock Z of natural resources can now increase or decrease . The variable Z in the
numerator captures that the xed cost becomes relatively less important as the natural stock rises,
pushing  up. On the other hand, we have the local ine¢ ciency e¤ect in the denominator (Zb) that
pushes  down. The nal impact of Z on  will depend on parameter values. For our particular
functional forms, a su¢ cient condition for the level of FD to fall with the stock of natural resources
is that (Y   F )b > d .
The same is true for results in sub-section 2.3 under the said assumption. To understand this,
notice that expression (17) would become:
"

Y + (1  b^)pN   F   d^
L2y2 + (1  b)pN   F
2 
=
n
[1  (1  ^)]1 

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Y=L
o

L
L2
 
1 b
1 b^
2
h
Y F d^
(1 b^)N + p
i2   (1  )2h
L2y2 F
(1 b)N + p
i2   (1  )2 :
(22)
This implies that N a¤ects both sides of the equality and ^ a¤ects the LHS in the same way as in
(17). However, the variation of ^ impacts the RHS di¤erently, because now there is a component
of the cost (d^) borne by a scally decentralized economy that is independent of the natural stock.
As a consequence, a resource windfall can generate a positive or negative variation on ^. Again,
given our specic functional forms, it can be proven that if (Y   F )b > d the negative volatility
e¤ect will dominate and CG will decrease ^ as a response to an increase in N for a su¢ ciently
small p and a su¢ ciently high ratio Y=y2.
Last, another simplication in the model is that the levels of g and  are the same in all regions.
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Its main implication is that the distribution of Z between regions within the union is irrelevant for
the level of g. It has been made for tractability purposes. However, Raveh (2013) for example nds
that within a union resource rich regions o¤er lower tax rates and greater public good provision
compared to those o¤ered by the resource poor ones. Applying this to the model would not provide
further insights. The reason being that neither of the two main forces, namely the incentive of
risk averse agents to reduce revenue volatility and the internalization of local ine¢ ciency, would be
qualitatively altered if g and  are not forced to be the same in both regions.
3 Empirics
The theoretical analysis revealed potential mechanisms for the e¤ects of resource booms on the level
of FD; however, to understand the direction and magnitude of these, as well as to further motivate
some parts of our framework, we turn to the data. Hence, in this section we provide empirical
evidence for the association between resource booms and decentralization. We rst motivate our
focus on FD as opposed to political decentralizationand later investigate whether resource booms
decrease the level of FD, as hypothesized in the theoretical analysis. We also try to shed light on
the mechanisms pointed out by the model. In particular, we test whether the decrease in the degree
of FD is driven by the risk sharing channel, and if this is applicable more specically to nations
with relatively stronger RGs. The Appendix describes in detail the countries and variables in each
sample, including descriptive statistics.
3.1 Decentralization and natural resources
Resource booms may lead to changes in various aspects of decentralization, with the scal and
political dimensions being the two key ones. We start by examining conditional correlations to
better understand the patterns at hand. We employ a panel that covers the period 1970-1995 in
5-year intervals, and includes 44 countries.13 The underlying model is the following:
Dit = 0 + 1Xit + 2Ri;t 1 + 'i + t + "it; (23)
where Dit is the decentralization level for country i at time t, Xit is a vector of controls, Ri;t 1 is
the resource proxy, and 'i and t represent country and time xed e¤ects, respectively.
Previous studies on the determinants of decentralization have found that land area, income level,
population size, institutional quality, and urbanization represent signicant explanatory variables,
each of them with a positive e¤ect.14 Given these ndings, we include them in the control vector,
13This is a maximized sample limited by the availability of data.
14See Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), and Treisman (2006).
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with the exception of land area which has no time variation (and thus absorbed by the country
xed e¤ects). In addition, we note the essential role of institutional quality in our case. In the
model we abstract from making any specic assumptions on institutional quality; thus, including it
in each of the specications serves not only for maintaining consistency with the FD literature, but
also for motivating our theoretical framework. In a later sub-section we present further robustness
tests using this measure.
Variables in X are measured as follows:15 institutional quality by the Political Rights Index
(Freedom House); income level by the logarithm of real per capita GDP; population by total
population; and urbanization by the share of urban population in total population. For the resource
proxy, we start with the one suggested by the model in expressions (18) and (16): the GDP share of
resource rents; in particular, the share of oil rents. We focus on oil because it represents a relatively
large share of total resource rents. Oil has also a more exogenous nature compared to other types
of resources, because oil-related operations are often managed by multinational rms that bring
their own technology and production factors, making such operations largely independent of the
countrys development level. We test additional proxies in later sections.
The level of decentralization is captured by the Kearney Decentralization Index (Arzaghi and
Henderson (2005)). Although there are other decentralization indices, we choose to employ this
one primarily because it enables us to capture relative bargaining powers of CG and RG across
countries, which takes an important role in the analysis. In addition, it covers a relatively large
time period over a wide and heterogeneous sample that includes both developing and developed
economies. Last, it allows us to use a balanced and complete panel, as opposed to other measures
which present incomplete data.16 The Kearney index is comprehensive and covers nine distinct
dimensions which touch on both the scal and political aspects of decentralization, namely: gov-
ernment structure, selection of regional executive, selection of local executive, override authority,
revenue raising authority, revenue sharing, education authority, infrastructure authority, and police
authority; in the Appendix we describe each in more detail. Two of these dimensions are directly
related to FD: revenue raising authority, and revenue sharing; the remaining ones are concerned
with more politically-oriented aspects. Each dimension is measured by a number between 0 and 4,
with 4 representing the highest level of decentralization and 0 the least.
Equation (23) is estimated for each of the nine dimensions and for the overall index, using
OLS. Results appear in Regressions 1-9 of Table 1 for each of the components and the aggregated
15Unless specied otherwise, all data come from World Bank Development Indicators. See Appendix for more
detailed information.
16For instance, in the World Banks Fiscal Decentralization Indicators (a measure of FD that we adopt later for
robustness tests), some countries have observations for only one or two time periods.
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index; the exception is the revenue raising authority dimension, because this one is the focus of
our subsequent analysis, and the equivalent benchmark results for it are presented separately in
Regressions 1 and 5 of Table 2. As can be seen, oil rents are negatively correlated with the two
abovementioned scally-related dimensions, and have no signicant association with the remaining
politically-related ones. Moreover, there is also an apparent negative relationship with the overall
index, which seems to be entirely driven by the correlation with the FD channels.
To better distinguish between the FD-related and non-FD-related (political) dimensions, we
look into the aggregated measures of each. The rst, FD-related, group is an aggregation of the
revenue sharing and revenue raising authority components, whereas the second, non-FD-related,
group is an aggregation of the remaining ones. Regressions 10 and 11 present the results of the
linear estimations of each of them. Here, the distinction is even clearer: the FD-related group has
a signicant negative association with oil rents, whereas the second group does not.
In addition, given the discrete nature of the Kearney Index, we test the above using probit
estimation. More specically, since the use of country-specic dummy variables is too demanding in
the non-linear model, we exclude them from this specication. Instead, we follow the methodology
set by Wooldridge (2005) and add various time-invariant controls to address the xed-e¤ects issue.
These controls are the following: land area, latitude, legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, and the
mean values of all time-variant independent variables. Marginal e¤ects are reported in Columns
12 and 13, for the FD-related and non-FD-related groups, respectively. Results indicate that the
negative e¤ect is sourced solely in the FD-related dimensions, consistent with the outcome observed
in the linear cases, thus motivating our focus on FD in the analysis presented in the following sub-
section.
3.2 Fiscal decentralization
Our next task is to dig deeper into the e¤ects of resource booms on the level of FD. Following
the earlier discussion, we concentrate initially on the Revenue Raising Authority dimension. This
dimension measures the subnational governments formal authority to raise their own revenue
through taxation. Hence, from the two scally-related dimensions this one is more consistent with
the models notion of decentralization, motivating our choice of it.17 Results are presented in Table
2.
We start by estimating Equation (23) using OLS. Keeping exposition to the minimum, we
discuss only the main coe¢ cients of interest, though nonetheless we note that results on all other
17Nonetheless, we note that results do not change qualitatively if instead we employ the Revenue Sharing dimension,
an average of the two scally-related dimensions, or the overall index.
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controls are consistent with those reported in previous studies (with some sensitivity in signicance
to certain specications). The basic result appears in Regression 1. As reported previously, the
coe¢ cient on the resource share proxy is negative and signicant, conrming the main hypothesis 
oil booms decrease the level of FD. In terms of magnitudes, the result indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in the GDP share of oil rents is associated with a decrease of one fth of a
standard deviation in the level of FD.18
Since FD is regarded as being relatively persistent, we add its level at t   1 as an additional
explanatory variable in Regression 2. As expected, its coe¢ cient is positive and signicant providing
some indication to the hypothesized persistence. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient on the resource share
proxy remains negative, signicant and similar in magnitude, showing that our main result also
holds under this dynamic setting.
In Regression 3, we investigate the hypothesis of having U-shaped e¤ects. As the anecdotes
discussed initially imply, the relationship may not be linear: while FD can drop initially, it may
increase if the level of oil rents becomes su¢ ciently large. To test this hypothesis, we add a squared
term of our resource measure to the model. The coe¢ cient on the squared term is indeed positive,
but lack any statistical signicance. This is consistent with the predictions of the model: given
a decision not to secede, resource booms decrease the level of FD continuously, with no apparent
U-shaped patterns.
Next, to be further consistent with the model, we look into the notion that regional demands
matter when examining the resources-FD nexus. To test this, we employ the Override Authority
component of the Kearney Decentralization Index. This dimension assesses whether the central
government has the legal right to override the decisions and policies of lower levels of government;
it is a dummy variable that can take a value of either 4 or 0, with 4 representing the existence of
such legal right. This measure enables us to control for CGs role, and interpret the main results as
being triggered by RGsperspective, at least to some extent. We add this measure, together with its
interaction term with the resource share proxy, to the model. Results appear in Regression 4. The
interaction term is negative and signicant, consistent with the model: CG seeks full centralization,
so that having a dominant one in a resource dependent economy provides a centralization-premium.
Importantly, the coe¢ cient on the resource share proxy remains negative and signicant, suggesting
FD is also an outcome of regional demands, consistent with the said hypothesis. We study further
this cross country distinction in relative bargaining powers of CG and RG, and its consistency with
the model, in a later sub-section.
18Although not presented, if we employ as resource proxy the GDP share of rents from di¤use-source resources
(agriculture, shing, hunting, and forestry) at t  1, the estimated coe¢ cient is non-signicant. This strengthens the
preference for focusing on oil-related resources.
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As before, due to the discrete nature of the Kearney index we undertake some probit estimations
of Equation (23). We follow the same methodology described earlier, in Table 1, only here we also
add the level of FD at the initial period (instead of its rst lag) in the dynamic case, consistent with
Wooldridge (2005). Results appear in Regressions 5-8, which are essentially the probit-version of
Regressions 1-4. The reported marginal e¤ects indicate that the main result holds: resource booms
decrease the level of FD, even under the dynamic setting, present no U-shaped e¤ects, and may be
an outcome of regional demands.
3.3 Mechanisms
The model points at potential mechanisms for the negative e¤ect of resource discoveries on FD,
distinguished by the incentives of CG and RG and their relative bargaining power; specically, CG
may have direct access to the resource rents thereby increasing its income, whereas RG may have
an incentive to redistribute some of the rents to share the risk involved. Nonetheless, we can think
of other potential channels associated with the ultimate source of the observed outcome, such as
institutional change, ethnic fractionalization, capacity of the region to make decisions, outcome of
a violent environment, or the degree of openness. Since institutional quality is already controlled
for in all specications, and ethnic fractionalization is included in the probit cases, we test each of
the other potential mechanisms. Results from this exercise are presented in the last ve regressions
of Table 2.
Starting with openness, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argue that increased economic integration
leads to secession. Therefore, it could be that the underlying mechanism works through this
channel. To test this we add a standard measure of trade openness to the model: the GDP share
of trade. The result in Regression 9 refutes this hypothesis to some extent. As can be seen, the
main coe¢ cient of interest remains negative and signicant, thus implying the mechanism at work
is di¤erent.19
A second option is that the changes in FD are an outcome of violent political acts. The connec-
tion between resource booms and violent conicts has been discussed extensively in the literature;20
hence, resource booms may a¤ect FD through that channel. This may be especially applicable in
economies with weak institutions. We test this hypothesis in Regression 10 by controlling for in-
ternal armed conicts. Thus, based on data from the Uppsala Conict Data Program, we add an
indicator for whether an internal armed conict has taken place in the investigated time period.
19Note that the coe¢ cient on openness is negative and weakly signicant, which although points at an opposite
direction to that proposed by Alesina and Spolaore (1997), is consistent with ndings of other studies on FD (e.g.
Letelier (2005)).
20See, for instance, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009).
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The negative and signicant coe¢ cient on the resource share proxy implies that the changes in FD
are not a consequence of this.
Third, we test the hypothesis that the result is driven by a simple mechanical outcome where
CG appropriates RGs resource rents to itself. Put di¤erently, it may be the case that regional
governments follow the will of the central one because the latter has the legal right to enforce it; in
e¤ect, this is an additional test for whether regional demands indeed matter, as emphasized by the
model. To look into that we run a version of Regression 4, only with the interaction term excluded;
i.e. we add to the model the Override Authority measure discussed above. Results appear in
Regression 11. Again, the coe¢ cient on the resource share proxy remains negative and signicant,
implying this is not the underlying e¤ect. We discuss this channel further in a later sub-section,
where we test its relation to the risk sharing channel, as implied by the model.
Next, we test the e¤ect of increasing risk. We attempt to capture the total e¤ect of resources
on risk through a proxy that measures the overall volatility in the economy. Following Poelhekke
and Van der Ploeg (2009), volatility is measured by the standard deviation in the growth of real
GDP per capita calculated over the intervals that we consider. Adding this measure in Regression
12, we estimate a negative coe¢ cient on the volatility proxy, consistent with the risk-heterogeneity
trade-o¤ put forward by the model. In addition, we see that once the risk component is controlled
for, the e¤ect of resources is an order of magnitude lower and is no longer statistically signicant,
providing evidence that the underlying mechanism may be one that pertains to the increasing risk
involved with resource booms, and thus ultimately to the incentive to share risk. We note that
although this result represents an average e¤ect that applies to the sample as a whole, in a separate
sub-section below we show this result is specic to, and driven by, the economies that have a
relatively stronger RG, as suggested by the model.
Last, we try to disentangle the e¤ect of the two risk components: relative ine¢ ciency, and
revenue volatility. Data limitations do not allow us to test the dominance of each directly, but
we can nevertheless attempt to do so indirectly. The abovementioned literature often indicates
that local ine¢ ciencies tend to be worse in economies with relatively weaker institutional quality,
whereas the revenue volatility e¤ect is triggered primarily by international shocks. Therefore,
although institutional quality is already controlled for, if the local ine¢ ciency e¤ect is dominant,
we can expect to see relatively more centralization in economies with weaker institutions. To test
that, we add an interaction term of our institutional quality and resource measures (the latter at
t  1) in Regression 13. The lack of signicance of the coe¢ cient on this interaction term provides
some indication that the key e¤ect may be the one related to the revenue volatility.
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3.4 Robustness checks
So far, we used the GDP share of oil rents to capture the degree of resource abundance. We
preferred this measure given its relatively wide use in the relevant literature. Nonetheless, this
measure is potentially endogenous (see, for example, Van der Ploeg (2011)); to the extent that
resource extraction is systematically associated with unobserved development factors, our results
may su¤er from an endogeneity bias. We address this concern by employing two additional resource
proxies that are based on exogenous components of the output-based measure.
The rst one relates to the discovery of giant oil elds, and is based on data provided by Horn
(2011). A giant oil eld is dened to be one for which the estimate of ultimately recoverable oil is at
least 500 million bbl of oil or gas equivalent. Horn (2011) reports total ultimately recoverable bbl
of oil and gas equivalent estimated at the time of discovery for all giant oil elds discovered from
1868 to 2011; we employ these data but focus on the giant oil elds discovered during our samples
time interval. Compared to oil rents, the new measure is more exogenous for two reasons. First,
giant oil elds present potential for making signicant amount of prots, which in turn attract even
more interest by large multinational rms, making extraction-related activities independent of the
local economy. Second, this measure provides the stock of potentially extractable oil, as opposed
to the ow of rents.21
The second alternative looks into the variation in the international real price of oil. Changes in
output-based measures may be driven by factors such as resource discoveries, extraction technology,
and prices. The rst two are potentially endogenous, whereas under reasonable assumptions the
latter can be regarded as exogenous because oil prices are determined in the international market.
We then build a proxy that exploits this exogenous variation in the international price of crude oil.
The measure is constructed as follows: for each country, we take the GDP share of oil rents in
the earliest year available and multiply it by the average international real price of crude oil at time
t. Thus, we keep the share of oil rents in GDP constant, and weigh it using oil prices that give the
required variation. Figure 2 shows that the relative international ranking in the GDP share of oil
rents has changed little over time; countries that were largely oil rich at the beginning of the period
(1965) appear to hold their relative ranking 30 years later, with a correlation of 0.85. Keeping
the share of oil rents in GDP constant, hence, can still capture accurately the countriesrelative
position with respect to their resource abundance over time. Hence, to the extent that changes
in international oil prices are exogenously driven and that initial oil output is pre-determined, we
argue that the variation we investigate is indeed exogenous since it is entirely triggered by changes
21 In e¤ect, we follow the approach of Lei and Michaels (2014) who look into the e¤ects of giant oil elds on internal
armed conicts, by arguing for the relative exogeneity of the former based on similar reasoning.
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in the international price of oil.
Table 3 provides results using these two additional variables. More specically, Regressions 1 to
5 and 6 to 10 show estimated coe¢ cients for the e¤ect of natural resources on the level of FD using
giant oil elds and the price-based measure, respectively. In both cases, results are qualitatively
identical to the ones obtained in Regressions 1 and 9 to 12 of Table 2. The coe¢ cient on the
resource measure is negative and signicant, making the main result robust to the new proxies. As
before, the exceptions occur when we include the volatility measure. Consistent with the baseline
analysis, Regressions 5 and 10 in Table 3 show that the risk sharing proxy is negative and signicant,
while natural resources are not. This provides additional evidence that resource windfalls a¤ect FD
through the risk channel. Nonetheless, as with the benchmark results, here as well we emphasize
this represents the average result across our sample; below we look into the di¤erential e¤ects across
levels of relative CG strength.
Next, we test the main hypothesis using a di¤erent FD measure. We follow Davoodi and Zou
(1998), Oates (1985), and Zhang and Zou (1998), and employ the World Banks Fiscal Decentral-
ization Indicators, which are based on data from the International Monetary Funds Government
Finance Statistics. From the several alternatives provided by the World Bank, we pick Vertical
Imbalance, which is the one that most closely resembles the models notion of FD. This indicator
measures the degree to which subnational governments fund their expenditures through their own
revenue sources, and is a number between 0 and 100. A higher value means more independent
subnational governments in terms of relying on their own revenue sources for their expenditures,
implying that the country as a whole is more scally decentralized. The sample under the new
variable covers the period of 1972-2000 and includes 78 countries. Given that observations are not
available for all years and countries, we employ an unbalanced panel and 4-year time intervals to
maximize coverage.
All other variables included in the regressions are identical to those used in the initial speci-
cations (Tables 1-3), with the exception of being adjusted in terms of time intervals. Results are
reported in Table 4. Regressions 1 to 4 again show a negative and signicant impact of the resource
share proxy that works primarily through the increased-risk mechanism.
Finally, we address two additional points. The rst relates to the di¤erent underlying channel
across levels of relative CG strength; the second discusses some potential sample selection concerns.
Starting with the rst, the model suggests that the risk sharing channel would be at work in
economies with relatively stronger RGs, yet would not be accounted for in those with a more
dominant CG. This, in turn, implies that the observed results on volatility, presented as an average
across the whole sample, is entirely driven by the former type of economies, and should bear no
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e¤ect in those of the latter type.
To test this, we split the sample to two groups, based on the level of relative CG strength.
While the division can be based on the Override Authority measure discussed earlier, we base it
on the cumulative score of the political dimensions, as in Regressions 11 and 13 of Table 1, to
exploit further potential cross country variation.22 The division is based on the 50th-percentile
score; being above (below) it is regarded as having a relatively stronger RG (CG).23 Other, more
restrictive, divisions yield similar results, yet this one makes a relatively more equal division that
we nd appropriate for addressing sample selection concerns. Thus, the relevant cases for the risk
sharing mechanism proposed, namely those in which RG has more signicant bargaining power,
have a wide coverage of both developing and developed economies.24 In fact, these relevant cases
span over the vast majority of the countries in our sample, suggesting the risk sharing channel may
not necessarily be a feature of a small subset. Importantly, given the smaller sample sizes tested,
we mainly look for di¤erences in coe¢ cient magnitudes between the two groups.
Results appear in Regressions 1-5 of Table 5. Regressions 1-3 replicate the benchmark speci-
cation, as in Regression 1 of Table 2. The rst uses the whole sample, and simply adds volatility
to the baseline specication. This is similar to Regression 12 of Table 2, only without the various
additional channels, indicating that the e¤ect of volatility is not specic to the specication used;
it is apparent regardless of the other channels. In Regressions 2 and 3, however, we estimate the
same specication with volatility, under the divided samples. Through the signicant di¤erences
in the magnitudes on our coe¢ cient of interest, it can be seen that the risk sharing channel is at
work only in the subsample in which RG is relatively stronger (Regression 3); conversely, when CG
is relatively stronger resource booms continue to decrease FD regardless of volatility. This pro-
vides some support to the model which suggests that risk sharing is applicable in cases where RG
has some signicant bargaining power, whereas in those in which CG is stronger FD is decreased
irrespective of risk.
To observe this more clearly, Regressions 4 and 5 replicate 3 and 4, only volatility is excluded.
Interestingly, we see that while the coe¢ cient in the case of a strong CG remains largely the same,
the one in the case of a strong RG signicantly increases, to levels similar to those observed under
a strong CG, while maintaining similar levels of standard errors to those in Regression 3. This
22Nonetheless, we note that basing the division on the Override Authority measure yields similar results.
23Given multiple median-valued observations the division is not equal; the strong RG (CG) group, thus, includes
101 (103) observations.
24The following is the list of countries that have at least one observation with an above 50th-percentile cumu-
lative score of the political dimensions (i.e. relatively stronger RG, at time t): Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, UK, USA,
Uganda, and Venezuela.
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further illustrates that the risk channel is at work only in cases where RG is relatively strong.25
Moving to the second point, we realize that the rather limited sample of 44 countries may raise
sample selection concerns. We follow Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) for our baseline decentraliza-
tion measure, which was constructed based on data availability. Assuming that data availability
is positively associated with institutional quality, we next test the applicability of the main result
to economies with relatively weaker institutions, to mitigate concerns related to potential biases
caused by the countries not included in the sample.
As a rst step we reexamine Regression 13 of Table 2; the statistically insignicant coe¢ cient
on the interaction term of oil and institutional quality suggests there are no systematic di¤erences
in the e¤ects of resource booms on FD across levels of institutional quality. Economies with
relatively weaker institutions should, thus, yield similar results to those observed under the general
sample. To test that, we restrict our sample to the bottom 10% of institutional quality, which
is the subsample that is expected to yield results that would most closely follow those in the set
of countries not included. Results appear in Regressions 6 and 7 of Table 5, which replicate the
baseline specication (Regression 1 of Table 2) using the restricted sample; the former uses the
baseline panel under the Kearney Index, whereas the latter adopts the extended one under the
World Banks Vertical Imbalance measure. Albeit having a signicantly smaller sample size under
these restricted cases, both show the main result holds; resource booms decrease the level of FD
even in economies with the relatively weakest institutions, thus addressing the initial point to some
extent.
In addition, we note that the magnitude is higher in both cases compared to the baseline.
Again, given the previously discussed result on the interaction term, we cannot infer that there is
a systematically stronger e¤ect under this restricted group. Nonetheless, estimating an outcome
that exceeds the average e¤ect implies that, if anything, the countries not included in the sample
are expected to intensify the observed main impact, further relieving concerns related to sample
selection.
4 Conclusion
Can resource booms unify nations? In light of previous theoretical work and various anecdotes,
one might suspect the answer is an unequivocal no. This paper, however, presented a new and
opposite perspective on this, through the case of FD. We provided empirical evidence indicating
that resource booms tend to decrease the level of FD, without a¤ecting political decentralization,
25The patterns observed in Regressions 1-5 are robust to including all other previously discussed additional controls.
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and showed the robustness of this to various measures of decentralization and resource abundance,
as well as to di¤erent controls, estimation techniques, and time periods.
In addition, we o¤ered a theory that rationalizes this counter-intuitive empirical nding through
a model of endogenous FD. The framework builds on two simple notions: rst, a trade-o¤ between
risk sharing and heterogeneity; and second, a positive association between resource dependence and
risk. With these two ingredients combined, the model showed that both the central and regional
governments have an incentive to increase centralization following a resource boom. While CGs
main incentives to centralize is to reduce local o¢ cialsextractive behavior or otherwise simply to
increase its own income, a result that is largely standard in the literature, the theory suggested
that RG may have a similar incentive as well through its objective to share the risks generated by
natural resource dependence with the rest of the nation.
In equilibrium, having some bargaining power, RG redistributes a positive amount of its resource
rents in exchange for a reduction in the degree of risk involved. Empirical testing of various potential
mechanisms implied that income volatility and, therefore, risk sharing is the primary channel that
drives the negative impact of natural resources on FD in nations with relatively stronger RGs, as
opposed to those with a relatively stronger CG where resource booms appear to decrease the level
of FD irrespective of the risk level. This is consistent with the predictions of the model.
The main policy implication of our paper for resource rich economies, in which RGs have some
bargaining power, is that general trends to scally decentralize, as well as regional secessionist
demands, may not be justied on economic grounds once risk sharing is accounted for. For example,
the increase in FD levels promised by the UK government to the Scottish during the independence-
referendum campaign in 2014 is probably attributed more to cultural and ethnic di¤erences than to
the discovery of oil reserves in the North Sea during the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, our results
are conned to the specic sample of countries and periods investigated; further research is still
needed to fully understand the forces behind the decentralization decision of governments and the
creation of nations.
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Appendix
A Data
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5 (Regressions 1-6) employ a panel that covers the period of 1970-1995 in 5-year
intervals; Tables 4 and 5 (Regression 7) employs a panel that covers the period of 1972-2008 with 4-
year intervals. Thus, variables correspond to those periods and time intervals in either case. Unless
stated otherwise, variables are measured in the initial year of the corresponding time interval.
Variable denitions
Kearney Decentralization Index : Measures decentralization through an average of nine dimen-
sions. Source: Arzaghi and Henderson (2005).
(i) Government Structure: Describes whether a country has a federal constitution;
measured as either 0 or 4, with 4 representing federal constitution.
(ii) Selection of Regional Executive: Measures whether a countrys regional executives
are elected; measured as either 0 or 4, where 4 means they are elected (note that regionalrefers
to states or provinces).
(iii) Selection of Local Executive: Measures whether a countrys local executives are
elected; measured as either 0 or 4, where 4 means they are elected (note that local refers to
municipalities or their functional equivalents).
(iv) Override Authority: Measures whether the central government has the legal right
to override the decisions and policies of lower levels of government; measured as either 0 or 4, where
4 means the existence of such legal right.
(v) Revenue Raising Authority: Describes sub-national governmentsformal authority
to raise their own revenue through taxation; measured as either 0, 2, or 4, where 4 represents having
the highest level of revenue raising autonomy and 0 the least.
(vi) Revenue Sharing: Describes whether a countrys central government regularly and
unconditionally transfers a portion of national taxes to lower levels of government; measured as
either 0, 2, or 4, where 4 represents having the highest level of revenue sharing and 0 the least.
(vii) Authority for Education: Measures responsibility for local primary education;
measured as a number between 0 and 4, where 4 represents having the highest local responsibility
and 0 the least.
(viii) Authority for Infrastructure: Measures responsibility over local highway construc-
tion; ; measured as a number between 0 and 4, where 4 represents having the highest local respon-
sibility and 0 the least.
(ix) Authority for Police: Measures responsibility for local policing; ; measured as a
number between 0 and 3, where 3 represents having the highest local responsibility and 0 the least.
GDP share of oil rents: GDP share of oil rents, expressed as a number between 0 and 1. Rents
are computed as unit rents times production, where a unit rent is dened as unit price minus unit
cost. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (e.g., see World Bank 2011).
Price-based oil measure: GDP share of oil rents in initial year multiplied by the average in-
ternational price of oil in time t (in thousands of real US$). Rents are computed as unit rents
times production, where a unit rent is dened as unit price minus unit cost. Source: World Bank
Development Indicators.
Institutional quality : Political Rights Index, expressed as a number between one and seven, one
presenting best institutional quality and seven least. Source: Freedom House.
Real per capita GDP : Real GDP per capita, in constant 2000 US$ prices. Source: World Bank
Development Indicators.
Population: Total population. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Openness: GDP share of trade. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
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Urbanization: Share of urban population out of total population, expressed as a number between
0 and 100. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Internal armed conicts: An indicator for whether an internal armed conict has taken place in
the investigated time interval. An internal armed conict is dened as a contested incompatibility
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. More
specically, an internal armed conict occurs between the government of a state and one or more
internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states. Source: Uppsala Conict Data
Program.
Giant oil elds: The logarithm of total recoverable bbl of oil and gas equivalent (estimated at
the time of discovery) of all giant oil elds discovered in the investigated time period. A giant oil
eld is dened to be one for which the estimate of ultimately recoverable oil is at least 500 million
bbl of oil or gas equivalent. Source: Horn (2011).
Vertical imbalance: : The extent to which sub-national governments rely on their own revenue
sources for their expenditures, expressed as a number between 0 and 100. Source: World Bank
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.
Land area: Land area in square KM. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Latitude: The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values
between 0 and 1). Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Legal Origin: Identies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code for each coun-
try. There are four possible origins: 1) English common law; 2) French commercial code; 3)
Socialist/Communist Laws; 4) German commercial code. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Ethnic Fractionalization: Reects probability that two randomly selected people from a given
country will not belong to the same ethno linguistic group. The higher the number the more
fractionalized the society. Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Volatility : The standard deviation of yearly GDP per capita growth in the 5 preceding years
(to the year inspected). Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Countries included in sample
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5 (Regression 1): Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, In-
dia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uganda, Venezuela.
Table 4: Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Table 5 (Regressions 2 and 4): Algeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador,
Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, Philip-
pines, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela.
Table 5 (Regressions 3 and 5): Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Thai-
land, U.K., U.S., Uganda, Venezuela.
Table 5 (Regression 6): Algeria, Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany,
Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, Uganda.
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Table 5 (Regression 7): Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Guatemala,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Russia, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
30
References
[1] Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., and Wacziarg, R., 2003. Fractional-
ization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8, pp. 155-194.
[2] Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E., 1997. On the Number and Size of Nations. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1027-1056.
[3] Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E., 2005. The Size of Nations. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
U.S.
[4] Araujo, M.C., Ferreira, F.H.G., Lanjouw, P., and Özler, B., 2008. Local Inequality and Project
Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5), pp. 1022-
1046.
[5] Arzaghi, M., and Henderson, J., 2005. Why Countries Are Fiscally Decentralizing? Journal of
Public Economics, 89, pp. 1157-1199.
[6] Bardhan, P., 2002. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 16(4), pp. 185-205.
[7] Bardhan, P., and Mookherjee, D., 2000. Capture and Governance at the Local and National
levels. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90(2), pp. 135-139.
[8] Beine, M., Coulombe, S., and Vermeulen, W., 2014. Dutch Disease and the Mitigation E¤ect
of Migration: Evidence from Canadian Provinces. Economic Journal, forthcoming.
[9] Blattman, C., Hwang, J., and Williamson, J.G., 2007. Winners and Losers in the Commodity
Lottery: The Impact of Terms of Trade Growth and Volatility in the Periphery 1870-1939.
Journal of Development Economics, 82, pp. 156-179.
[10] Blattman, C., and Miguel, E., 2010. Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), pp.
3-57.
[11] Boadway, R., 2006. Natural Resource Shocks and the Federal System: Boon and Curse? Fiscal
Federalism and the Future of Canada Conference Proceedings, Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations.
[12] Bolton, P., and Roland, G., 1997. The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1057-90.
[13] Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J., 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal
Constitution. Cambridge University Press, NY, U.S.
[14] Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., and Tabellini, G., 2012. The Political Resource Curse.
American Economic Review, 103(5), pp. 1759-96.
[15] Brosio, G., 2006. The Assignment of Revenue from Natural Resources. Chaper 17 in Handbook
of Fiscal Federalism, edited by Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio. Edward Elgar Publisher,
Northampton, MA, U.S.
[16] Brunnschweiler, N.C., and Bulte, H.E., 2009. Natural Resources and Violent Conict: Resource
Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars. Oxford Economic Papers, 61(4), pp.
651-674.
31
[17] Buchanan, J.M., and Faith, R.L., 1987. Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory
of Internal Exit. American Economic Review, 77, pp.1023-31.
[18] Cai, T., and Treisman, D., 2005. Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? De-
centralization, Globalization, and Public Policy. American Economic Review, 95, pp. 817-830.
[19] Campante, F.R., and Do, Q., 2014. Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption:
Evidence from U.S. States. American Economic Review, 104, pp. 2456-2481.
[20] Caselli, F., Michaels, G., 2013. Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from
Brazil. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1), pp. 208-38.
[21] Davis, J., Ossowski, R., Daniel, J., and Barnett, S., 2001. Stabilization and Savings Funds for
Nonrenewable Resources: Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications. IMF Ocassional Paper
205.
[22] Davoodi, H., and Zou,. H., 1998. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross
Country Study. Journal of Urban Economics, 43, pp. 244-257.
[23] Duek, A., and Rusli, R., 2010. The Natural Resources Industry in Decentralized Indonesia:
How Has Decentralization Impacted the Mining, Oil and Gas Industries. CREA Discussion
Paper 2010-5, University of Luxembourg.
[24] Fisman, R., and Gatti, R., 2002. Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal
Transfer Programs. Public Choice, 113, pp. 25-35.
[25] Freinkman, L., and Plekhanov, A., 2009. Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence
from Russia. World Development, 37(2), pp. 503-512.
[26] Galasso, E., and Ravallion, M., 2005. Decentralized Targeting of an Antipoverty Program.
Journal of Public Economics, 89(4), pp. 705-727.
[27] Glaeser, E.L., and Saks, R.E., 2006. Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics, 90,
pp.1053-1052.
[28] Goldsmith, A.A., 1999. Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in
Emerging Markets. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 58(4), pp. 866-883.
[29] Hateld, J., W., and Miquel, P.G., 2012. A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentraliza-
tion. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(3), pp. 605-633.
[30] Horn, M. K. (2011). Giant elds Data Set, Revision 16: AAPG - GIS Open le.
[31] Jia, R., and Nie, H., 2015. Decentralization, Collusion and Coalmine Deaths. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, forthcoming.
[32] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999. The Quality of Govern-
ment. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), pp. 222-279.
[33] Lei, Y., and Michaels, G., 2014. Do Giant Oileld Discoveries Fuel Internal Armed Conicts?
Journal of Development Economics, 110, pp. 139-157.
[34] Lambsdor¤, J.G., 2006. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from
a Cross-Section of Countries? In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption,
edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Chapter 1, Edward Elgar publishing.
32
[35] Letelier, L.S., 2005. Explaining Fiscal Decentralization. Public Finance Review, 33, pp. 15583.
[36] Mookherjee, D., 2015. Political Decentralization. Annual Review of Economics, 7, pp. 231-49.
[37] Oates, W., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Academic Press, NY, U.S.
[38] Oates, W., 1985. Searching For Leviathan: An Empirical Analysis. American Economic Re-
view, 75, pp. 748-757.
[39] Papyrakis, E., and Raveh, O., 2014. An Empirical Analysis of a Regional Dutch Disease: The
Case of Canada. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58(2), pp. 179-198.
[40] Perez-Sebastian, F., and Raveh, O., 2015. The Natural Resource Curse and Fiscal Decentral-
ization. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming.
[41] Persson, T., and Tabellini, G., 1996a. Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redis-
tribution. Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), pp. 979-1009.
[42] Persson, T., and Tabellini, G., 1996b. Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard.
Econometrica, 64(3), pp. 623-646.
[43] Panizza, U., 1999. On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory and Evidence. Journal
of Public Economics, 74, pp. 97-139.
[44] Poelhekke, S., and Van der Ploeg, F., 2009. Volatility and The Natural Resource Curse. Oxford
Economic Papers, 61(4), pp. 727-760.
[45] Poelhekke, S., and Van der Ploeg, F., 2010. The Pungent Smell of Red Herrings: Subsoil
Assets, Rents, Volatility, and the Resource Curse. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 60, pp. 44-55.
[46] Prudhomme, R. 1995. The Dangers of Decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer,
10(2), pp. 201-220.
[47] Raveh, O., 2013. Dutch Disease, Factor Mobility, and the Alberta E¤ect  The Case of
Federations. Canadian Journal of Economics, 46(4), pp. 1317-1350.
[48] Ross, M.L., 2004. What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of
Peace Research, 41(3), pp. 33756.
[49] Ross, M.L., 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. Annual Review of Political
Science, 9, pp. 265300.
[50] Seabright, P., 1996. Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Con-
tracts Model. European Economic Review, 40(1), pp. 61-89.
[51] Stroebel, J., and van Benthem, A., 2013. Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of
Expropriation: Theory and Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), pp. 1622-
1639.
[52] Treisman, D., 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study. Journal of Public
Economics, 76(3), pp. 399-457.
[53] Treisman, D., 2006. Explaining Fiscal Decentralization: Geography, Colonial History, Eco-
nomic Development, and Political Institutions. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, 44(3).
33
[54] Van den Bremer, T.S., and Van der Ploeg, F., 2013. Managing and Harnessing Volatile Oil
Windfalls. IMF Economic Review, 61(1), pp. 130-167.
[55] Van der ploeg, F., 2010. Aggressive Oil Extraction and Precautionary Saving: Coping with
Volatility. Journal of Public Economics, 94, pp. 421-433.
[56] Van der ploeg, F., 2011. Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 49(2), pp. 366-420.
[57] Wilson, J.Q., 1966. Corruption: The Shame of the States. Public Politics, 2, pp. 28-38.
[58] Wooldridge, M.J., 2005. Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem in Dynamic, Non-
linear Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
20(1), pp. 39-54.
[59] World Bank, 2011. World Development Indicators. The World Bank, Washington D.C, U.S.
[60] Zhang, T., and Zou, H., 1998. Fiscal Decentralization, Public Spending, and Economic Growth.
Journal of Public Economics, 67, pp. 221-240.
34
